Mar 22, 2019 10:51 by Администратор -

GRUEVISM & VUCICISM

The Serbian modern leader does not want or cannot see the storming into the Macedonian assembly as storming for the regime’s support, and that the storming into the Serbian RTS was storming for the regime’s fall.

writes: Zoran Ivanov

A topic about the Serbian president is not particularly attractive for the readers here, but it is susceptible as a comparison phenomenon regarding the events in the two neighboring countries. The frequently quoted events here and his accusations that Skopje is some kind of command center for his political demise point to two things about Aleksandar Vucic. Firstly, it is a compliment for the Macedonian current political set to be seen by Vucic as an opponent. Secondly, it is also a compliment because a politician with dictatorial manners lavishly and sweetly using them, perceives this current political Macedonia as the creator of his fall.

Identical as Gruevski, Vucic has also taken control of everything in Serbia. All the media that do not have foreign capital. Institutions, too. And everything in any way either state or under state budget control in any form. As the Macedonian ex Prime Minister, the incumbent President of Serbia has imposed marketing media populism as a practice that provides him with decades of rule. Vucic, just like Gruevski, thinks that he will manipulate the big players in Brussels and Washington by sitting on two, three chairs, while at the same time not effectuating neither democratic nor economic results at home. Current Serbian politics stubbornly refuses to come to terms with the fact that in the present international circumstances Moscow is not favorable. And it has its centuries-old strategic calculations. There are other priorities such as the Crimea, Ukraine, the Caucasus and that in the current international circumstances Serbia is not in its priority circle as a political partner. The model and ways of the collapse of the regime of Gruevski, Vucic now recognizes as tools of influential external factors and secret services for dealing with his disobedience. In that analogy, he saw a scenario for his political catapulting in the unpopular part of history.

The protests in Serbia are certainly merely a sprout to return to democracy in that country. They are led by intellectuals and part of the social middle-class civic layer. Although the economically most endangered Serbian peasantry and labor is still hard to move. The hypnotist populist policy of the inviolable Serbian ruler did its own thing. There still is no authoritative force in the society there, which will further upset the huge number of dissatisfied citizens. And the Serbian political alternative is without clearly defined attitudes on key issues such as the elusive idea of territorial exchanges, the final recognition of Kosovo and the integration NATO and EU offers. But the process has started and there is no stopping. Aleksandar Vucic is in power and he still counts on the inertness of the international community. It is a little early to say how long that situation will maintain him. It is likely to be known by the end of this year what the epilogue will be, what will these beginnings of Serbian civil protests result in, which individuals will be new leaders.

Lost in Kosovo’s politics, neither here nor there, the Serbian president neither managed to recognize his new neighbor, nor was he able to secure the autonomy of the Serb population there. His isolationist pragma and, in particular, the insincerity towards Brussels, has inevitably put him more in the ranks of the Venezuelan Maduro, for example, than the Hungarian Orban. Such a hopeless Gruevist policy left him helplessly wallowing in his own creation of Serbian political and economic problems. Vucic did not learn anything from the practices of the time of rise and especially from the time of fall of his political brother Gruevski. With his rooted nationalism as delayed puberty, this post Milosevic Serbian leader continued to cherish the ignoring of international signals. He underestimated the power of Kosovo’s supporters in Washington and did not realistically assess the possible interest of Moscow in it.

Blinded by narcissism, his own arrogance, his own populist manners whose mirror reflections, as political greatness, are daily served by his media, Aleksandar Vucic, like Nikola Gruevski, did not on time see the commitment and extraordinary efforts of the international factor interested in the Balkans. Ignoring the cooperation, he remained in the past. He has neither learned, not understood and, apparently, misinterpreted the events in Skopje. Identical to the Macedonian ex PM, he does not notice that the populist and despotic-designed rule is outdated. And, just like Gruevski, some kind of Orban is changing his mind. Like his Macedonian counterpart in power, he also does not see that Serbia is neither Russia, nor Turkey, least US or China, and it is in Europe.

Vucic and Gruevski understood each other well. They practiced identical swaying policies. One convinced his nation that it was biblical, the other convinced his nation that it was heavenly. With deep scars we came out of the covers of the oldest book in the world. Now they will have to do it too. From the celestial space, if it is possible, it is less painful to fall to the ground. For, as in the case of Macedonia, before the fall of Gruevski, present-day Serbia, with the incumbent Vucic, is still driving on a no way out road. He wanders with the outdated populist and nationalistic train that does not stop at the European track. The absence of this feeling of evolution, of movement, of mental reform in the practice of democratic policies, a little sooner or a little later, but very soon, identically as it happened to Nikola Gruevski, will inevitably happen to Aleksandar Vucic. First of all, it will cost him extra isolation from his despotic policy, and then demission from his presidency.

Brussels through Washington or Washington through Brussels, anyway, give up the co-operation with the Serbian president. He also received a “rejection” in Putin’s recent visit to Belgrade. Announced pompously as liberation from Western pressure on Serbia, the wise Russian leader went home a day earlier, leaving his host with his finger in his mouth with respect to the Kosovo issue. He had to know in advance that, in spite of the aggressive US policy in the Balkans, at the expense of other much more important strategic interests for it, Moscow will not enter the hot fire between Belgrade and Pristina. Left to his own choice for international isolation, angry opposition and indignant people, identical to the Macedonian ex PM, the Serbian president settled himself on the slippery political downfall from which there is no stopping. Nearly as Gruevski did in the last term of his reign, now Vucic loses the compass home, and for his present political position, he seeks the blame in the gloomy hostile forces from the outside. In doing so, he locates the base for his fall in Skopje. Hosts here have widely opened the doors for international logistics against his Serbia. He recognizes for himself the same scenario which Gruevski was forced to leave with.

By comparing the Macedonian events two years ago with current Serbian, Vucic’s xenophobic and paranoid mental structure, his ideological road inherited from his political great-Serbia mentors such as Milosevic, Sheshelj, Nikolic, simply cannot see the diametric difference between the Skopje and Belgrade events.

Following the example of all populists such as Gruevski, Vucic is also unable to perceive the contrasts between totalitarian states and democratic processes. To agree that the Skopje parliamentary events on April 27^th 2107 were an intrusion of violent retention of power, and Belgrade radio television events on 17^th March 2019 were an intrusion for the violent release of the truth.

The Serbian modern leader does not want or cannot see the storming into the Macedonian assembly as storming for the regime’s support, and that the storming into the Serbian RTS was storming for the regime’s fall.

The difference is small, only one hundred and eighty degrees.

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